Two studies used event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine whether and how divergent thinking and creative achievement are linked to attentional flexibility and cognitive control as indexed by response times and by the amplitude of the anterior N2 ERP component. Both experiments used an oddball paradigm in which participants viewed hierarchical letter stimuli and identified target letters in frequent and rare target trials. The successful identification of targets required attentional flexibility when switching levels of attention (from the frequent global to the rare local attentional level, or vice-versa). Divergent thinkers showed smaller switching times on rare target trials, indicating higher levels of attentional flexibility. Furthermore, divergent thinkers engaged cognitive control processes more strongly at the moment of the attentional switch (and before the response), as indicated by a larger N2 difference between frequent and rare targets. In contrast, creative achievement was associated neither with the switching times on rare target trials, nor with a larger N2 difference between frequent and rare targets. All results held when controlling for general intelligence. Results from these studies provide evidence that divergent thinking is associated with higher attentional flexibility and that such attentional flexibility relies on cognitive control processes required when disengaging from one level of attention (e.g., global), and shifting to the other level of attention (e.g., local).
Introduction
Creativity, like many mental activities, requires attention, but what form of attention is most conducive to creativity remains unresolved. The existing literature provides contradictory accounts on the link between creativity and attention, suggesting that creativity is linked with broad attention (Ansburg and Hill, 2003) , "leaky" attention, i.e., attention that allows "irrelevant" information to be noticed (Kasof, 1997; Zabelina et al., 2016) , attentional flexibility (Vartanian et al., 2007; Zabelina and Robinson, 2010) , and executive control, which relies heavily on the ability to focus attention (Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011) . Recent advances in the field, however, are beginning to elucidate these seemingly contradictory accounts by pointing to the crucial importance of distinguishing between the various operational definitions of creativity.
One of the most common ways of operationally defining creativity is through the performance on the Alternate Uses (Wallach and Kogan, 1965) or divergent thinking tests (Goff and Torrance, 2002; Torrance, 1974) . Both tests are aimed at assessing people's ability to generate multiple original uses for a common object or novel solutions to a stated problem within a limited amount of time in a laboratory setting (although the nature of the tests and instructions can vary). Participants are typically instructed to be creative, and are given 2-3 min to generate their creative ideas, with responses scored for fluency (i.e., number of pertinent responses within the allotted time), and originality of responses (i.e., how novel or original the participant's responses are compared to the responses within the experimental sample or compared to the established norms). Divergent thinking thus requires overcoming prepotent, uncreative response tendencies and involves cognitive strategies to arrive at novel ideas (Gilhooly et al., 2007) .
An increasing body of research suggests that creativity, operationalized with divergent thinking tests, tends to involve top-down control of attention (sometimes in combination with more spontaneous, undirected cognitive processes; Beaty et al., 2014) . Most of this evidence comes from latent variable studies showing effects of higherorder cognitive abilities, such as working memory capacity (Lee and Therriault, 2013; Süβ et al., 2002 ), verbal fluency (Benedek et al., 2011 Silvia et al., 2013) , and fluid intelligence (Beaty,Beaty et al., 2014;  
